Unconventional Duha Research Unitary

From Lived Suffering to Juristic Categories

Islamic law is not abstract speculation. From its earliest centuries, fiqh grew by watching how people actually lived, suffered, and acted. Jurists observed how human minds worked, how illnesses disrupted capacity, and how treatments affected dignity, then classified these realities into the framework of taklīf (legal responsibility). The majnūn (insane), the maʿtūh (simpleton), the sāqit al-ʿaql (those whose reason had fallen) were not defined in a laboratory—they were defined through lived cases, testimonies of families, and physicians’ reports.

The silenced soul of today—the medicated Muslim who testifies “I feel like a zombie; I miss my prayers but it is not my fault”—belongs to the same juristic legacy. Psychiatry often dismisses these voices as “normal side effects,” and secular law frames them medically, not morally or spiritually. Yet uṣūl al-fiqh already provides the tools to listen to these testimonies, translate them into legal categories, and protect the dignity of the afflicted.

I. Usul al-Fiqh: Principles for Listening to Lived Reality

1. Capacity as a Condition of Taklīf
   In uṣūl, obligation rests upon capacity (istiṭāʿah). Without it, rulings fall away or are modified. This is anchored in:
   Qurʾān: “Allah does not burden a soul beyond its capacity” (2:286).
   Ḥadīth: “The Pen has been lifted from the insane until he regains his reason, from the sleeper until he awakens, and from the child until maturity.”

This principle is not metaphorical. It obliges jurists to assess: does this person have capacity in reality, not in theory? If sedation erases will, if compulsion overrides choice, if anhedonia silences worship—capacity is impaired, and taklīf changes.

2. Observational Method: From Reality to Categories
   Jurists historically classified mental states by observing people:
   A man rational by day but incoherent at night → junūn ṭāriʾ (intermittent insanity).
   A person perpetually confused, unable to distinguish → maʿtūh.

A lucid but erratic mind → junūn mutaqallib.

This was istiqrāʾ (inductive reasoning): patterns of lived behavior, then mapped into categories. Testimonies were not dismissed—they were the very basis of fiqh classification.

3. Usul Principles That Prioritize Testimony

Several maxims demonstrate why patient voices matter:

Al-ʿāda muḥakkama (custom/recurring experience is authoritative): If multiple patients report sedation leading to missed ṣalāh, this becomes a binding consideration.

Al-yaqīn lā yazūl bi’l-shakk (certainty is not removed by doubt): The patient’s certainty of harm outweighs the doctor’s dismissal as “normal.”

Al-ḍarar yuzāl (harm must be removed): If medication harms spiritual life, it must be mitigated.

Mā lā yatimm al-wājib illā bihi fahuwa wājib (what is necessary for fulfilling an obligation is itself obligatory): If prayer requires alertness, then adjusting medication timing or dosage becomes a legal-religious necessity.

II. Historical Precedents: How Fiqh and Medicine Intertwined

Islamic law has never been silent on medical practice. The integration of medicine into fiqh shows that jurists constantly regulated, adjusted, and issued rulings based on observation of real harms and benefits.

1. Phlebotomy, Cupping, and Cauterization

Ibn al-Tilmīdh (d. 1165 CE) wrote a monograph on phlebotomy, preserved today in the National Library of Medicine.

These practices—fasd (bloodletting), ḥijāmah (cupping), kayy (cauterization)—were common. Jurists debated their safety, conditions, and religious acceptability.

Observational evidence was central: if bloodletting caused fainting or prolonged weakness, this was weighed under lā ḍarar.

2. Al-Zahrāwī and Surgical Responsibility

Al-Zahrāwī (d. 1013, Andalusia) wrote Kitāb al-Taṣrīf, a 30-volume encyclopedia, the last devoted to surgery.

He described 200 instruments and techniques, but emphasized surgery should only be performed by someone competent in medicine broadly.

This ethic—only the competent may intervene—was absorbed into fiqh: malpractice or recklessness carried liability.

3. Cautery, Then and Now

Cauterization, including electrocautery today, is permitted if medically necessary, under al-ḍarūrāt tubīḥ al-maḥẓūrāt (necessities permit prohibitions).

Contemporary fatāwā frame it the same way: permissible if benefits outweigh risks, impermissible if harmful or frivolous.

4. Hijāmah in Ḥadīth and Practice

The Prophet ﷺ said: “Healing is in three things: honey, the incision of a cupper, and cauterization…” (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, with conditions).

Jurists regulated when, where, and by whom hijāmah could be done. If excessive blood loss harmed the patient, it was prohibited.

5. Medical Ethics and Adab

Al-Ruhāwī’s Adab al-Ṭabīb (9th century) emphasized physician responsibility, dignity of patients, and avoidance of harm.

It shows fiqh did not merely permit treatments—it set ethical guardrails, requiring compassion, competence, and balance of harms.

Conclusion from Precedent:

Fiqh has always integrated medical testimony, regulated practices, and modified rulings based on observed reality. Psychiatric medications fall squarely into this historical trajectory.

III. Toward a Contemporary Framework

Just as fainting after phlebotomy modified rulings, sedation from antipsychotics must.

Just as surgery required competence, psychiatric prescribing must be scrutinized under adab al-ṭabīb.

Just as hijāmah was weighed against its harm, so must SSRIs, benzodiazepines, antipsychotics.

The method is the same: listen, observe, classify, rule.

Mercy as Law
The silenced soul is not outside Sharīʿah—it is the test of whether Sharīʿah lives. Fiqh historically never ignored testimony; it elevated it into law. To treat modern patient testimonies as “mere anecdotes” is to betray the very methodology of uṣūl al-fiqh.

Thus, fatwā councils today must:

Gather testimonies,
Translate them into fiqh language,
Deliberate with physicians,
Issue rulings that remove harm and preserve dignity.
This is not innovation—it is fidelity to the living spirit of our law.